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A cybernetic approach to modeling artificial emotion through the use of different theories
of psychology is considered in this paper, presenting a review of twelve proposed
solutions: ActAffAct, FLAME, EMA, ParleE, FearNot!, FAtiMA, WASABI, Cathexis, KARO,
MAMID, FCM, and xEmotion. The main motivation for this study is founded on the
hypothesis that emotions can play a definite utility role of scheduling variables in the
construction of intelligent autonomous systems, agents, and mobile robots. In this review,
we also include an innovative and panoptical, comprehensive system, referred to as
the Intelligent System of Decision-making (ISD), which has been employed in practical
applications of various autonomous units, and which applies xEmotion, taking into
consideration the personal aspects of emotions, affects (short-term emotions), and mood
(principally, long-term emotions).
Keywords: emotions, decision-making systems, cognitive modeling, human mind, computational models, fuzzy
approach, intelligent systems, autonomous agents
1. INTRODUCTION
Computational intelligence has been developing formany years. Recently, some engineering systems
may even have the neuron count corresponding to the capacity of a cat brain (meaning the usage of
1.6 billion virtual neurons connected by means of 9 trillion synapses, which follow the neurological
construction of a cat brain) (Miłkowski, 2015). Despite the fact that there is no unique definition of
awareness, there areworks that describe certain autonomous robots passing the test of self-awareness
(Hodson, 2015), which is a moot point. On one hand, a rustic experiment concerning a robot, which
recognizes itself in a simplistic situation (in a mirror), does not prove any kind of awareness. On the
other hand, leaving aside intelligence, in some aspects and experimental settings, the currently
developed machines (such as industrial robots and mechatronic systems) are even more efficient
than men, given the repeatability and precision. Nevertheless, there is still a huge gap in intelligence
between the implemented computer systems and the majority of animals, let alone humans.
One of the major differences between a human and a humanoid robot relies on the feeling and
expressing of emotions. For this reason, robots appear to be heartless to people. To reduce this
appearance, a considerable number of robot-oriented projects have begun to take into account the
handling of emotions, especially to simply simulate them (without whatever internal effects). As far
as emotions are concerned, there are several projects which take into account the issue of expressing
emotions by a robot, e.g., Kismet, Mexia, iCube, Emys, etc. [Breazeal (Ferrell) and Velasquez, 1998;
Esau et al., 2003;Metta et al., 2011]. However, the crux of the problem lies not in acting the emotions,
but in the feeling and functioning of emotions.
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A dual problem is connected with the issue of recognizing
emotionsmanifested by a human. There are several research stud-
ies concerning the recognition of facial expressions, the tempera-
ture of the human body, or body language. However, there are no
useful signs of mathematical modeling and practical simulation
of human emotions. Perhaps, knowledge in the topic of creating
and evolving/variability of human emotions is still not sufficient
to carry out such a study.
Accepting a certain predominance of the system of needs, the
mechanism of emotions constitutes a second human motivation
system. This mechanism is the result of evolution (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1990). The emotions evolved quite early, as a reaction
to more and more varied problems and threats from environ-
ment. Despite various theories, there is currently a belief that
not only humans and but also apes have mechanisms of emo-
tions. The principal problem of proving this theory results from
difficulties in precise determination of the animals’ emotional
states. According to the latest achievements in the field of biology
and neuroscience, not only mammals (dogs, cats, rodents) have
emotions but also birds (Fraser and Bugnyar, 2010), : : :, and even
bees (Bateson et al., 2011) express emotions. The studies of apes,
as the animal closest to human in the biological sense, are par-
ticularly important. Gorillas are able to use elements of human
language and can even recognize and verbalize their emotional
state (McGraw, 1985; Goodall, 1986).
Basically, emotions in robotics and artificial intelligence are
designed to create a social behavior of robots, and even make
them somehow similar to people. The aims of Human–Machine
Interaction can also be recalled here. On the other hand, by
incorporating a computational model of emotions as part of a
behavioral system, we can shape a counterpart for a model of the
environment. An agent with reactive emotions is able to make
sophisticated decisions, despite the lack of a full-size model of a
complex environment. Such emotions can provide the agent with
important information about the environment, as is the case with
the human pattern.
1.1. Arguments for the Research
The main reason for developing a computational system of
emotions is the lack of top-down approaches in the available
autonomous robotics’ results. Moreover, there is no system which
would model human psychology suitably for the purpose of
autonomous agents (nor in a general sense). There are behavior-
based robotic systems (BBR), which focus on agents that are able
to exhibit complex behaviors despite simple models of environ-
ment, which act mostly by correcting their operations according
to the signals gained from their sensors (Arkin, 1998). Such BBR
systems can use emotions as internal variables, which drive their
external actions. Therefore, the idea of computational emotions
is applied here as a means to promote acting (in a virtual or
laboratory world) of an independent agent, who is able to adapt
to the changing environment.
Computational modeling of emotion in itself can lead to effec-
tive mechanisms, which may have impact on various develop-
ments in psychology, artificial intelligence, industry control and
robotics, as well as in haptic systems and human–system/robot
interaction. It is a truism to say that such mechanisms can be
practically utilized to show the deficiency of existing theories,
weak points of implementations, and incorrect assumptions. Cer-
tainly, unusually detailed implementational studies have to be
performed to show where those flaws in theory are. On the other
hand, putting into practice a workable computational system can
also demonstrate which parts of psychological theories are coher-
ent and reassure the appropriateness of the undertaken directions
of further studies. Created complex cognitive architectures based
on the computational model of emotion can, for instance, be used
to rationalize the quest for the role of emotion in human cognition
and behavior.
Adapting the emotional systems to complex control applica-
tions may lead to more intelligent, flexible, and capable systems.
Emotions can supply data for the method of interrupting normal
behavior, for introducing competing goals (specially selected, and
profitable), and for implementing a generalized form of the so-
called scheduling variable control (SVC), leading tomore effective
reactive behavior. Social emotions, such as anger or guilt, may
minimize conflicts between virtual agents in multiagent systems.
The computational models of emotions are not new in AI, but
they are still underestimated, and most researchers focus their
attention rather on the bottom-up models of human thinking,
such as deep learning/neural networks and data mining.
1.2. Purpose and Structure of the Article
In this article, we try to answer the following question: what are
the types of computational models of emotion, and to what extent
do they reflect the psychological theories of emotion?
First, the paper presents a short introduction to psychological
theories of emotions by showing different definitions of emotion,
as well as the processes of their creation, or triggering. In addition,
the parameters of emotion, such as duration, intensity, and color,
are introduced.
While in the main part of the paper, we will review a selection
of the recently developed computational systems of emotions; it
is worth noting that today this branch of robotics and cognitive
systems develops poorly, although there are many computational
systems of emotions created in the last 15 years.
2. EMOTION IN PSYCHOLOGY
The physiological approach postulates that emotions have evolved
from the process of homeostasis. Taking into account cyber-
netic achievements, the process of emotion is a homeostat. It
is a subsystem designed to “maintain the functional balance of
the autonomic system” (Mazur, 1976) by counter-action of the
information and energy flow that reduce the possibility of envi-
ronmental impact. In other words, emotions should customize
the behavior of a human, agent, or robot, to better respond to
the stimuli from the surrounding environment. It is observed
that once the system has to process too much information, the
role of emotions overpowers the process of selection of a suitable
reaction. Moreover, there are theories that treat emotions (such as
pain, relaxation, security, leisure, and health) as (self-regulatory)
homeostatic (Craig, 2003; Jasielska and Jarymowicz, 2013).
There are several psychological theories, which provide a
certain definition of emotion. According to Mayers (2010)
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“emotions are our body’s adaptive response.” Lazarus and Lazarus
(1994) claim that “emotions are organized psycho-physiological
reactions to news about ongoing relationships with the envi-
ronment.” A similar viewpoint is represented by Frijda (1994):
“Emotions (: : :) are, first and foremost, modes of relating to the
environment: states of readiness for engaging, or not engaging,
in interaction with that environment.” Finally, there is also a
definition derived from evolutionary considerations, presented
by Plutchik (2001), saying that “Emotion is a complex chain
of loosely connected events which begins with a stimulus and
includes feelings, psychological changes, impulses to action and
specific, goal-directed behavior.”
Besides the challenge of defining the emotion, there are also
theories relating to the process of the creation or triggering of
the emotion. Psychologists are supporting (mostly) one of two
main streams: somatic and appraisal. Appraisal theory suggests
that before the occurrence of emotion, there are certain cognitive
processes that analyze stimuli (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). In
such away, the emotions are related to a certain history of a human
(agent or robot). The relation to the history should follow the
process of recognition (since the objects and their relations to the
agent’s emotion should be first recognized). Thus, the appraisal
theory postulates a certain priority of cognitive processes over
emotions. On the other hand, the somatic theory concedes that
emotions are primary to cognitive processes (Zajonc et al., 1989;
Murphy and Zajonc, 1994). Prior to analyzing a perceived object,
and even before recording any impressions, the (human) brain
is able to immediately invoke an emotion associated with this
object.
Plutchik’s approach to the problem of modeling emotions
shows that both the above-mentioned theories can be correct.
From the evolutionary point of view, the appraisal theory need
not be the only selection. Emotions should allow an agent to take
immediate actions (such as escaping from a predator) right after
certain stimuli show up, without cognitive processes (Izard, 1972).
Moreover, there are certain experiments that show the occurrence
of emotion in early stages of human life. These kinds of emotions
are based on neuronal or sensorimotor processes evolving in
species (Plutchik, 1994).
There are a number of parameters that can characterize an
emotional state. A group of similar emotions can be attributed
to a definite color and labeled as joy, happiness, or ecstasy. This
type of grouping can also be interpreted as generalization of
emotions, known in psychology as the concept of basic emotions
(Arnold, 1960; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980). Recognition of such
an emotional color allows us to model and predict the evolution
of the emotional reaction of a human.
There are also dimensional models of emotions in psychology
(Russell, 1980; Posner et al., 2005; Lövheim, 2012), which use a
parameter referred to as an emotional intensity, known also as
stimulation, energy, or degree of activation. Emotional intensity
describes how much the emotion affects the agent’s behavior.
Emotions of the same color are thus divided into several states
based on intensity.
An important parameter concerns the duration of emotions.
This may range from a few seconds to several weeks, some-
times even months. Emotional states which take longer than a
FIGURE 1 | Classification of emotions, based on duration time
(Oatley et al., 2012).
few months are rather personality traits or emotional disorders
(Figure 1). Consequently, due to the time duration, emotions can
be divided into (Biddle et al., 2000; Oatley et al., 2012):
 autonomous changes: very short (in seconds), spontaneous
physical feelings (Ekman, 2009), connected with the somatic
theory of emotions, dependent on certain stimuli, without
recognition of situation, object, or event (such as the fear of
something in darkness);
 expressions: short (in seconds), associated with objects and
based on the appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991) of emotions
(e.g., calmness associated with the places or objects from
childhood);
 “classical” emotions: lasting longer, consciously observed, ver-
balized (named), and associated with both theories, possibly
combined motivational factors, and related to objects (such as
the commonly known emotions: joy, happiness, anger, etc.);
 mood: long (lasting days or months), consciously perceived,
of intensity smaller than that of the “classic” emotion, and
characterized by slow, positive, or negative changes (Batson,
1990);
 emotional disorders: kind of depression, phobia, mania, fixa-
tion, etc.;
 personality features: emotions based on personality, such as
shyness and neuroticism.
3. CLASSIFICATION OF COMPUTATIONAL
MODELS OF EMOTIONS
In general, most systems can be classified according to
 psychological theory (under which they were created), such as:
 evolutionary (LeDoux and Phelps, 1993; Damasio, 1994),
 somatic (Zajonc et al., 1989; Damasio, 1994), and
 cognitive appraisal (Frijda, 1986; Collins et al., 1988; Lazarus
and Lazarus, 1994; Scherer et al., 2010);
 components involved in the formation of emotion (Scherer
et al., 2010), such as:
 cognitive (external environment),
 physiological (internal, biological/mechanical environ-
ment), and
 motivational (internal psychological environment);
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 phases involved in the emotional process (Scherer et al., 2010),
such as:
 low-level evaluation of emotions – creation of primal emo-
tions, based on simple stimuli,
 high-level evaluation of emotions – creation of secondary
emotions, based on emotional memory,
 modification of the priorities of the objectives/needs,
 implementation of the agent’s actions,
 planning behavior,
 deployment behavior, and
 communication;
 the applied description of emotions, such as:
 digital/linguistic/binary (only labels),
 sharp – label and valence (discrete or continuous), and
 fuzzy.
Further arguments on the computational models of emotions
can be found in the literature (Sloman, 2001; Breazeal, 2003; Arbib
and Fellous, 2004; Ziemke and Lowe, 2009). As will be shown
hereinafter, each of the exemplary systems described below in
Subsection 4 can be (freely) attributed to a subset of the above
characterizations.
4. A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE EXISTING
PROPOSALS FOR COMPUTATIONAL–
EMOTION SYSTEMS
The theory of cognitive appraisal is one of the most common
ideas used in the design of computational systems of emotions
(Gratch and Marsella, 2004). According to this theory, the emo-
tions are created based on the appraisal of currently perceived
objects, situations, or events. Appraisal is created on the basis
of the relationship between perceived elements and individual
beliefs, desires, intentions (BDI) of the agent (Lazarus, 1991). This
relationship is known as the personal–environmental relationship.
Such systems do not take into account the possibility of the
occurrence of emotions before recognition of an object, event, or
situation. It is clear that this type of recognition requires a lot of
computing power and therefore the emotions generated by those
systems do not occur in real time, which generally contradicts the
general idea of emotions (as well as the SVC approach).
In the literature, one can find many works concerning the issue
of modeling human emotions considered here: CBI (Marsella,
2003), ACRES (Swagerman, 1987),Will (Moffat and Frijda, 1994),
EMILE (Gratch, 2000), TABASCO (Staller and Petta, 2001),
ActAffAct (Rank and Petta, 2007), EM (Reilly, 1996), FLAME (El-
Nasr et al., 2000), EMA (Gratch and Marsella, 2004), ParleE (Bui
et al., 2002), FearNot! (Dias, 2005), Thespian (Mei et al., 2006),
Peactidm (Marinier et al., 2009), Wasabi (Becker-Asano, 2008),
AR (Elliott, 1992), CyberCafe (Rousseau, 1996), Silas (Blumberg,
1996), Cathexis (Velásquez andMaes, 1997), OZ (Reilly and Bates,
1992),MAMID (Hudlicka, 2005), CRIBB (Davis and Lewis, 2003),
and Affect and Emotions (Schneider and Adamy, 2014). However,
some of them are either freely/weakly connected with the psycho-
logical aspects of emotions (e.g., ACRES) or away from a strict
mathematical wording of the issue (FAtiMA Modular, MAMID).
Moreover, in general, most psychologists shun attempts to relate
their considerations to a mathematical synthesis of emotional
phenomena.
To give a taste of these specific issues, several selected compu-
tational systems of emotion are presented in the following.
4.1. ActAffAct
Acting Affectively affecting Acting is an emotional architecture for
agents operating as actors. It is intended to give a greater credibility
to the characters in computer games, chatterbots, or other virtual
characters (Rank and Petta, 2005, 2007). The system is based on
the scheme of the emotional valence from the appraisal theory of
emotion. As a result, new events, objects, or actions are evaluated
in terms of the goals, standards, and tastes of the considered agent.
For example, the agent can feel joy after disarming a bomb, but
before that, it may feel hope and fear. The system functioning can
be described as a transition between the four phases: perception,
appraisal, decision-making (relational action tendency – RAT),
and execution. The perception phase relies on the translation of
external information to an intelligible form for cognitive appraisal.
Emotions are created based on appraisal, so that the RAT tries
to reconfigure the currently executed actions and behaviors. In
fact, the reported application based on ActAffAct concerns a
simple scenario with several virtual characters and objects, where
the agents, in accordance with experienced emotions, choose the
appropriate current target, and then a suitable response. Thus,
ActAffAct is a decision-making system based on a current situ-
ation rather than on a general goal.
In view of Subsection 3, ActAffAct reflects emotions solely as
labels. The system is based on the above-mentioned BDI model,
in other words, the actions of the agent are based on its pre-
programed beliefs (we can thus talk about the personality of crim-
inals, for instance). ActAffAct covers all phases involved in the
emotional process. Appraisal, that is formation of emotions, uses
the cognitive and motivational components (Scherer et al., 2010).
4.2. Fuzzy Logic Adaptive
Model of Emotions
FLAME is a computational system based on a model of emotions
by Collins et al. (1988). It takes into account an emotional eval-
uation of events (El-Nasr et al., 2000). During the occurrence of
a new event, FLAME assesses an emotional value of the event
in relation to the objectives of the agent. In particular, FLAME
takes into account which objectives are fulfilled (at any level, even
partially) by the occurrence of the event and calculates an event
impact. Then, the system determines its own assessment, based on
the significance of certain targets (the importance of goals). These
data are an input to a fuzzy system (Mamdani and Assilian, 1975),
which calculates desirability of events. Based on the appraisal of
the events, emotions are created according to the fuzzy desirability
and several other rules as presented in Collins et al. (1988). For
example, the emotion of joy is the effect of a desired event, whereas
sadness is generated when the agent experiences an adverse event.
Due to the fuzziness of the system, emotions appear in groups.
For example, sadness is accompanied by shame, anger, and fear.
For this reason, emotions need to be filtered. In the FLAME
system, filtering is performed using simple rules (e.g., a greater
joy may exclude sadness). In addition, FLAME has a built-in
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interruption system, based on motivational elements (such as
needs). As a result, the emotion-driven behavior of the FLAME
agent can be overpowered by the effects of motivations (needs).
The agent’s behavior is determined by the filtered emotions
processed using a fuzzy method. For example,  the anger is high
 the vesselwas taken  the behavior is barking. The system
can learn by one of four implemented methods:
 conditioning: linking the object with emotion,
 with reinforcement learning: changing the assessment of the
impact of events into the realization of the objectives,
 probabilistic approach to learning the patterns of behavior, and
 heuristic learning which leads to gratifying behavior.
FLAME was used as a driver for a pet in virtual simulations.
The resulting pet action consisted of the voice actions: barking,
growling, sniffing, etc. (expressing emotions posing a feedback to
the owner), and other actions, such as looking, running, jumping,
and playing. Emotions created by FLAME greatly improved the
pets’ behavior and their appearance/credibility.
In view of Subsection 3, the FLAME system is based on the the-
ory of cognitive appraisal. In the formation of emotions, only the
cognitive components are involved. Despite the factual presence
of motivation components, they do not affect the emotions. Emo-
tions serve only to select the agent’s behavior but cannotmodify its
goals/needs. Fuzzy emotions used in FLAME are definitely much
more intuitive and allow for easier inference.
4.3. Emotion and Adaptation
EMA is a complex emotional system which has many appraisal
variables (Gratch and Marsella, 2004, 2005). Among them, we
distinguish (Gratch and Marsella, 2004):
 relevancy – whether the event needs attention or action,
 desirability – if the event coincides with the goals of the agent,
 causality – whether the agent is responsible for the event,
 opportunity – how likely was the event,
 predictability –whether the event was predictable based on past
history,
 urgency – whether the delay response is important,
 commitment – to what elements of personality and motivation
the agent refers the event,
 controllability – whether the agent can affect the event,
 self-variation – whether the event can change itself,
 power – power which is required to control the event, and
 adaptability – whether the agent will be able to cope with the
consequences of the event.
Emotions are generated using a mapping algorithm based on
the model of Elliott (1992). They take into account the vari-
ables mentioned earlier in the context of certain perspectives.
For example, hope comes from the belief that something good
might happen (desirability>0 and the ability<1). Each of the 24
emotions has its individual intensity.
Coping strategies, used for solving problems, are clearly deter-
mined by emotions (Lazarus and Lazarus, 1994). Such strategies,
however, work in the opposite direction than cognitive appraisal
(constructing the emotions). In fact, a certain coping strategy has
yet to determine the cause of emotions andmodify the whole BDI
mechanism, if necessary. Among them, we distinguish (Gratch
and Marsella, 2005):
 actions, selected for implementation,
 plans, forming intentions to carry out acts,
 searching for support (e.g., seeking help),
 procrastination, waiting for an external event, designed to
change the current circumstances,
 positive reinterpretation, giving a positive side effect for nega-
tive actions,
 acceptance,
 denial, reducing the likelihood of adverse effects,
 disconnecting mental abasement from the desired state,
 shifting responsibility (blame, pride, contribution) for the
effects of actions to certain factors (rather external), and
 attenuating information or consulting other sources.
In EMA, inferences and beliefs are derived from post hoc anal-
ysis. EMA can run with a set of actions and a set of recipes for
combining these actions, or with a set of simple responses of
the emotion-action type. This idea was partly implemented using
SOAR (State, Operator, and Result) – a cognitive architecture
similar to expert systems (Laird et al., 1987; Newell, 1994; Laird,
2012), in a very simplistic scenario that describes the agent dealing
with an angry bird (which can attack or fly away). However,
this experiment proves only the implemented small part of the
concept, rather than the entire developed concept of EMA.
In view of Subsection 3, the EMA system has extensive possi-
bilities for interpretation of external stimuli. The agent’s emotions
are sharp. In the process of creating emotions, motivational and
cognitive components are involved. EMA also considers planning
and implementing of its behavior.
4.4. ParleE
ParleE is a computationalmodel of emotions prepared for a virtual
agent for communication purposes used in a multiagent environ-
ment (Bui et al., 2002). The model is based on the OCC theory
of Collins et al. (1988) and a model of personality (Rousseau,
1996). Detected events are evaluated based on previously learned
behavior using a probabilistic algorithm. The system consists of
five basic blocks. A block called the Emotion Appraisal Compo-
nent evaluates events in terms of the agent’s personality, taking
into account its plans and the models of other agents. After this
evaluation, the block generates a vector of emotions. A working
plan (an algorithm of actions to achieve a certain purpose) is
generated by a Scheduler block, also with the use of the models of
the other agents. This block calculates the probability of achieving
the goals, next used to create a vector of emotions. The following
blocks: emotion component, emotion decay component, models
of other agents, modify the vector of emotions by taking into
account further aspects, such as motivational factors, personality,
or behavior of other agents (in terms of the gathered information).
The system takes into account ten emotions of varied intensity,
created on the basis of the rules of OCC theory.
ParleE was implemented as a conversational agent Obie, which
communicates with its interlocutor via textual interface and facial
3D expressions. The scenario presented by the authors using three
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options of the agent’s personality: sensitive, neutral, and opti-
mistic, can be described as: “Obie goes to the shop and buys bread.
He brings the bread home. The user eats his bread” (Bui et al.,
2002). The applied realizations of Obie react in three different
emotional ways. The sensitive becomes really angry, the neutral
is just angry, and the optimist ignores events and remains happy.
In view of Subsection 3, ParleE uses the sharp form of the emo-
tion descriptions which are built of the components characterized
as both motivational and cognitive. In addition, ParleE takes into
account the models of own personality and other agents’ behavior
(which is a rare feature).
4.5. FearNot!
FearNot! represents a PC application that supports the removal
of violence from schools (Aylett et al., 2005; Dias, 2005; Dias and
Paiva, 2005). It simulates situations in which you sympathize with
a victim. To achieve such a sensitive goal, this application must be
credible both in terms of behavior and emotions. Emotions in the
FearNot! system have six attributes:
 name/label,
 valence (negative or positive),
 source (objects associated with each emotion),
 cause,
 intensity (sharp value which decreases with the passage of
time), and
 time of occurrence.
FearNot! takes into account the emotional parameters of the
agent: its mood and sensitivity. When the agent is more energized,
it feels emotions more intensely. The mood of the agent increases
or decreases the possibility of positive or negative emotions
(Picard and Picard, 1997).
Emotions are created based on cognitive appraisal of the current
situation of the agent, performed using the OCC model. It is
also related to the agent’s plans. Implementation of plans also
reflects on emotions (as it can generate hope, fear, or satisfaction).
Emotions associated with perceived objects (that are the sources
of emotions) indicate which objects require the attention of the
agent. This feature is also a part of the agent’s plans.
Executive strategies are divided into policies of coping with
emotions and solving problems. The first type of strategy is
intended to change the interpretation of the currently perceived
stimuli and other conditions (which resulted in feeling emo-
tions). It embraces such strategies as acceptance of an adverse
reaction, wishful thinking, planning or execution of a certain
action.
FearNot! is a story-telling application with an anti-bullying
message to children. The story in this application arises as the
interaction between the user and the virtual agent (which affect
each other). This approach is called the emergent narrative.
In such a way, the users of FearNot! can learn about violence
(Figueiredo et al., 2006).
In view of Subsection 3, FearNot! represents the most com-
prehensive approach to computational systems of emotion. Emo-
tions, described using sophisticated structures, are conditioned
by cognitive, motivational, and reactive elements. Changing the
interpretation of emotions is possible. The main objective of
emotions is to (SVC) control the behavior of the agent and its
communication with others.
4.6. FAtiMA Modular
Fearnot AffecTIveMindArchitecture is an emotional architecture
designed to control an autonomous virtual agent. It is an upgraded
version of the FearNot! system of emotion (Dias et al., 2014). The
FAtiMA phases of the processing cycle may be enumerated as:
 perception,
 appraisal,
 goal-based planning (similar to BDI), and
 execution of actions.
The specified phases are quite similar to the universal model of
a BDI agent, described by Reisenzein et al. (2013).
The appraisal process in FAtiMA is founded on the theory of
Scherer et al. (2010), which can be generally described as follows.
The appraisal process is incremental and continuous. It is (basi-
cally) sequential as the applied appraisal components have their
own order. The process generates certain appraisal (emotional)
variables, which are important tools in decision-making. The
FAtiMA system also takes into account the OCC model, where
the appraisal variables can have a definite impact on different
emotions as indicated in Table 1. Clearly, as a developed version
of FearNot!, FAtiMA is also founded on the story-telling paradigm
(Battaglino et al., 2014).
In summary – the FAtiMA system presents a quite coherent
continuous-time concept of emotions, in which emotions are cre-
ated using the OCC reasoner and the Scherer theory of appraisal.
It thus apparently relies on the appraisal theory of emotions. The
emotional state of the agent is, however, related also to other fac-
tors, including external stimuli, which is clearly attributed to the
somatic theory of emotions. Cognitive and motivational elements
are involved in the process of creating emotions. Emotions gen-
erated by FAtiMA can be treated as a sheer emotional expression
or a desired reaction of an agent (which should be perceived by
humans as natural).
4.7. WASABI
Affect Simulation Architecture for Believable Interactivity is an
example of another computational system of emotion, where
emotions are modeled in a continuous three-dimensional space
(Becker-Asano, 2008, 2014; Becker-Asano and Wachsmuth,
2010), described as a pleasure arousal dominance (PAD) space
(Russell and Mehrabian, 1977). Areas in the PAD space have
labels ascribed to the primal emotions. The secondary emotions
(e.g., relief and hope) are formed on the basis of higher cognitive
processes.
TABLE 1 | Referencing the emotions to the appraisal variables, based on
OCC (Dias et al., 2014).
Appraisal variable Emotions
Desirability Joy, distress, gloating, pity, resentment
Praiseworthiness Pride, admiration, shame, reproach
Like Love, hate
Goal-connected Hope, fear, relief, satisfaction, disappointment
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The composed WASABI system consists of two parallel
processes/sub-modules, such as emotional and cognitive. The
emotional process creates a vector of emotions on the basis of
relevant pulses, or triggers, received from the ambient environ-
ment and the cognitive module, which generates signals of sec-
ondary emotions. They result from the assumed BDI model and
an Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) architecture.
The cognitive module is also responsible for decisions about the
desired action, and for transferring them to perform. A third
module connecting emotion and action is intended to generate a
speech signal taking into account current emotions.
The WASABI module of emotions can be used for emulating
the emotions of MAX, a virtual tour agent in the virtual museum
guide scenario. This approach allows the guide to have its own
human-like emotions, which affect on its current conversations
conducted as “small talk.” For example, MAX analyzes the envi-
ronment in the context of human skin color, and every new person
triggers a positive emotional impulse in its PAD space, which
results in the “emotion-colored” responses of the agent. This
simulation was presented at several public events (Becker-Asano,
2008).
In summary, and in view of Subsection 3 – theWASABI system
does not rely only on the appraisal of the situation. In addition to
receiving external stimuli, the system can change its emotions by
itself, due to the passage of time. Moreover, the continuous-time
nature of emotionsmeans that at anymoment of time the agent has
some emotional state. Thus, both the cognitive elements and time
are involved in the process of creating emotions. However, emo-
tions can only modify the way of speaking, but not the behavior of
the agent.
4.8. Cathexis
Cathexis is the systemwhich first took into account the hypothesis
of somatic markers (Damasio, 1994). This hypothesis states that
the decisions taken in circumstances similar to the previous ones
induce a somatic sign (as the outcome can be potentially beneficial
or harmful). This is used for making prompt decisions on future
events, in the case of possible gain or danger (threat). TheCathexis
system consists of five modules: perception, action, behavior,
emotions, and motivation (Velásquez and Maes, 1997; Velásquez,
1999).
The perception module is used for receiving and process-
ing sensory information, which later reaches the modules of
behavior and emotion. The motivation module consists of four
needs: energy/battery, temperature (at which it is driven), fatigue
(amount of consumed energy), and interest. The emotional mod-
ule is created based ondifferent theories of emotion, includes basic
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, joy, disgust, and surprise) and
mixtures of them [e.g., the theory of Plutchik (1994), joy, and fear
arise to a sense of guilt, : : :]. Basic emotions emerge as a response
to various stimuli from the environment. The emotional module
takes into account also secondary emotions, linked to objects
(Damasio, 1994; Ledoux, 1998). Behavior module generates the
most suitable reactions based on the emotion and motivation
of the agent. The reactions are then implemented by the action
module.
The Cathexis system was implemented in Yuppy, “an Emo-
tional Pet Robot” (Velásquez, 1998), whose needs were formu-
lated as: recharging, temperature, fatigue, and curiosity, repre-
sent senses from different sensors. Emotions and needs definitely
influence the behavior of the Yuppy. In practice, Cathexis chooses
one behavior (for instance, “search for bone”) for a given set of
these two factors.
In view of Subsection 3, the Cathexis system is based on evo-
lutionary, cognitive appraisal, and somatic theories. Cognitive,
physiological, and motivational components are involved in cre-
ating emotions. The system plans and implements its behavior in
relation to both low-level and high-level emotions, described as
discrete.
4.9. KARO
KARO is an alloy of modal logic, dynamic logic, and accessory
operators of motivation (Meyer et al., 1999; Meyer, 2006). It
models emotions in a logical language, where one can distinguish
operators of knowledge, beliefs, actions, abilities, and desires. The
system uses four free-floating (not connected to external objects)
emotions, associated with certain attitudes:
 happiness, triggered by achieving goals,
 sadness, triggered by failing goals,
 anger, triggered by being frustrated by the active plan, and
 fear, triggered by goal conflicts or danger.
The KARO system uses a BDI-like cognitive notion of emotion,
which can be used in practical implementations. However, it is
only a theoretical description of emotional agents, with its empha-
sis on the dynamics of themental states of the agent and the effects
of its actions.
Implementation of KARO was assessed by running it on a
platform iCAT (playing humanoid- and cat-robot functions, with
the ability of presenting facial expression).
In view of Subsection 3, KAROuses certain cognitive andmoti-
vational components in the task of creating emotions. The KARO
system evaluates emotions (as labels) and modifies the agent’s
priorities. Unreservedly, the system is not based on the available
evolutionary, somatic, or cognitive appraisal theories; however, it
implements some elements from the OCC theory.
4.10. MAMID
MAMID implements an extended processing cycle (Hudlicka,
2004, 2005, 2008; Reisenzein et al., 2013). From the universal
model of the BDI-agent point of view, the MAMID system adds
attention (filtration and selection processes), and expectations as
additional phases. It is also supported by long-term memory of
beliefs and rules. MAMID is highly parameterized and enables
manipulation of its architecture topology. It appears to be quite
universal in terms of possible applications.
Emotions in MAMID are created using external data, inter-
nal interpretations, desires, priorities, and individual character-
istics. Emotions have their own valence and affective states (one
of the four basic emotions: fear, anger, sadness, and joy). The
system can represent the specificity of the human/individual
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differences/personality (such as attention speed or aggressive-
ness), emotions, memory, and certain cognitive parameters,
which are all used to select the most suitable reaction.
MAMID was evaluated as the model of decision-making for
an agent (with a few different personality types) in a certain
experimental scenario. The goal of the agent was to keep calmness
in several different situations (such as in the view of a destroyed
bridge and hostile crowd). Different emotions were triggered
depending on the actual situation and the agent’s personality.
In summary, the MAMID system implements the appraisal
theory of emotion. It uses cognitive and motivational elements to
create emotions, which are sharp. Unfortunately, there are only
four distinct emotions.
4.11. Emotion Forecasting Using FCM
Salmeron (2012) suggests using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM)
as a tool for predicting human emotions that are modeled on
the concept of Thayer (1989), which takes into account both the
arousal (the level of agents excitation/boredom) and the valence
(positive or negative in general terms). The states/values of arousal
and valence can be interpreted as the vertical and horizontal coor-
dinates of the current point/status on a circle of emotion shown
in Figure 2. The model is constructed using information from
the analysis of mood and bio-psychology concepts. Emotions in
this model may take one of twelve values: excited, happy, pleased,
relaxed, peaceful, calm, sleepy, bored, sad, nervous, angry, and
annoyed. In addition, Salmeron (2012) evaluates every emotion
in the trivalent scale: light, medium, and strong. As a result, the
model has 36 possible states of emotion.
FuzzyCognitiveMaps collect and represent the knowledge nec-
essary for a specific fuzzy-neural system of inference (FNIS) about
emotion. There are four different stimuli inputs in the input layer
responsible for “noise,” “high temperature,” “scare waiting time,”
and “few people waiting.” The specific elements in the hidden
layer are described as “waiting” and “anxiety,” which in turn
FIGURE 2 | Circle of emotion, arousal, and valence (Thayer, 1989;
Salmeron, 2012).
generate the system emotional outputs: valence and arousal. The
transitions between the layers of the network are being weighed,
and the system is always able to generate a certain emotion.
The described system does not fully use the fuzzy model of
emotions, as the emotions are represented only by labels assigned
to the specific 36 ranges of emotional variables (derived from
the arousal and valence). This model can be classified into the
appraisal theory of emotion. The components involved in the
derivation of emotions can be classified as cognitive (inputs to
FCM/FNIS) and motivational (treating the waiting and anxiety in
the hidden FNIS layer as a mixture of mood and belief).
4.12. xEmotion
The concept of ISD, the Intelligent System of Decision-making
(Kowalczuk and Czubenk, 2010b, 2011), allows an agent to con-
struct individual emotions in a subsystem referred to as xEmotion
(Kowalczuk and Czubenko, 2013), in response to observations
and interactions.
The xEmotion subsystem is based on several different theories
of emotion, also including the time division. First of all, it imple-
ments the somatic theory of emotions (Zajonc et al., 1989; Dama-
sio, 1994), as a concept of pre-emotions. Pre-emotions are the
most raw form of emotions, which are connected to impressions
(basic features perceived by the agent), such as pain and rapid
movement. They can also appear as a result of a sub-conscious
reaction (such as crying – impression of tears). The second com-
ponent of xEmotion is sub-emotions – emotions connected to
certain objects or situations, which have an important, informative
aspect to the agent. They are evidently connected to the appraisal
theory of emotion. However, the appraisal of sub-emotions takes
place in case of a strong emotional state (in contrast to the classical
appraisal approach). This state is remembered/associated with
certain perceived objects (in a current scene and in the time of
strong emotion), and a next occurrence of this object (in future)
will trigger a certain sub-emotional state. Sub-emotions will decay
with the passage of time (based on a forgetting curve).
These two elements can modify an actual emotional state of
the agent, called a classical emotion, which is also influenced by
time lapse and a global rate of fulfillment of the agent’s needs
(besides the emotional components). It is clear and natural that
the agent’s emotion is often in its neutral or quasi-neutral states,
where it evolves with the passage of time. On the other hand, the
system of emotion is also affected by the basicmotivational system
of the ISD-based agent, which is a system of the agent’s needs.
The ISD need system is similar to Beliefs, Desires, Intentions
(BDI); however, it focuses on long-term goals. Mood (a long-
term emotion) is automatically generated based on the classical
emotion using a mechanization of quasi-derivative.
There are 24 possible emotions in the xEmotion subsystem
of ISD. They are based on the Plutchik concept of emotions
(Plutchik, 2001) and fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965). However, only the
sub-emotions and the classical emotion may take-over 1 of the
24 labeled/linguistic emotions,modeled as fuzzy two-dimensional
variables. The applied pre-emotions, in view of their simplicity,
can assume only one of eight primal emotions (imaging only
sections/colors on a wheel/rainbow of emotion), also modeled
with the use of the fuzzy description.
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Thus, emotions in the ISD system have their specific purposes.
Their main role is to narrow the possibilities of choosing the
agent’s reactions (but not to decide which particular reaction is
to be implemented). This means using emotion and a generalized
scheduled variable for controlling the agent, according to the SVC
scheme. In such a way, the current operation point of the whole
ISD system can be suitably adapted. This is not the only function
of emotion. The (derivative) mood adjusts the value of the fuzzy
coefficients of a needs’ subsystem, allowing the agent’s needs to
reach the state of satisfaction at a faster or slower rate.
The ISD concept was initially applied as a “thinking” engine,
which controls a simple mobile robot using a restricted Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs, as well as in governing an interactive avatar
DictoBot (Kowalczuk and Czubenko, 2010a) and automatic
autonomous driver xDriver (Czubenko et al., 2015) [see also
Kowalczuk et al. (2016) for the development of the agent’smemory
itself].
In summary, xEmotion, as a part of the ISD decision-making
concept, is an emotional system based on the appraisal and
somatic approaches to emotions. It has some minor elements
taken from the evolutionary theory of emotions, especially the
application of emotion as a self-defense mechanism. Cognitive
(sub-emotions), physiological (pre-emotions), and motivational
(needs) components are involved in creating emotions. This
system changes its operating point, and thus also its behav-
ior/reaction – taking into account (inner) qualia and classical
emotions, also interpreted using fuzzy logic.
5. COMPARISON OF THE DISCUSSED
SYSTEMS
A short comparison of the research results concerning compu-
tational models of emotion is presented in Table 2. Moreover,
the applications of the presented systems are shortly described
in Table 3. Clearly, it is difficult to compare various systems
of emotion due to the lack of a common, sufficiently universal,
and comprehensive measure. All of the discussed models and
systems, however, have some impact on the IT domain under
consideration. Their impact on the humanities is unfortunately
low. Themain conclusion, which can be drawn from the presented
overview, is as follows: almost all of the computational models
of emotions employ the theory of appraisal as their scientific
background. This is a bit controversial. There are also other the-
ories that treat about the creation of emotions, but unfortunately,
they are not in use as the foundation of computational emotions.
Another aspect of the proposed systems of emotions is that both
sharp and fuzzy logic representations can be effectively used in
such systems.
Unlike most of the developed models, the xEmotion system
is based on evolutionary, somatic, and appraisal theories. It is a
combination of approaches leading to one coherent concept of
emotion. The emotions are created based on cognitive (appraisal
of events and objects), physiological (needs connected to the envi-
ronmental aspects), and motivational (needs and emotions them-
selves) components. All phases mentioned by Scherer et al. (2010)
are involved in xEmotion. The xEmotion system also creates emo-
tion based on impressions/sensations and stimuli. That makes the
system evenmore effective in hazardous or other special situations
requiring a rapid response. Similar toCathexis, xEmotion employs
the fuzzy representation of data in several applications, including
modeling of emotions, which is characteristic of the human way
of understanding the world. Note that the xEmotion system opti-
mizes and constructs a sole and limited set of actually available
reactions. This system, therefore, does not directly determine
the behavior of the controlled (managed) agent, it only allows
the agent to choose (later) one appropriate response from this set.
One may see this approach as a clear improvement over the other
proposed models under discussion (see Table 2).
TABLE 3 |Applications of the discussed computational systems of emotion.
System Application
ActAffAct Virtual scenario with different objects
FLAME Virtual pet
EMA Virtual scenario of dealing with angry bird
ParleE Virtual conversational agent
FearNot! Story-telling application
FAtiMA Story-telling application
WASABI Virtual guide agent
Cathexisc Yuppy robot
KARO iCat robot
MAMID Virtual decision-making scenario
FCM emotions Computational simulation
xEmotion Currently in development
TABLE 2 | Comparison of the discussed computational systems of emotions.
System Theory Driver Components Type of
emotions
Relation with
environment
ActAffAct Appraisal Relational Action Tendency Cognitive and motivational Labels BDI
FLAME Appraisal OCC, fuzzy rules Motivational Fuzzy MDP
EMA Appraisal Appraisal variables Cognitive, motivational Sharp Planning actions, BDI
ParleE Appraisal Probability, OCC, Rousseau Motivational, cognitive Sharp Creating emotional vector
FearNot! Appraisal, somatic, evolutionary OCC, plan Motivational, cognitive, reactive Class Strategies
FAtiMA Appraisal OCC, Scherers appraisal Cognitive, motivational Continuous Expressions, reaction
WASABI Appraisal, evolutionary ACT-R, BDI Motivational, cognitive Continuous Shape of voice
Cathexis Appraisal, somatic, evolutionary Mixtures of emotions Motivational, cognitive, reactive Fuzzy Generator of behavior
KARO Partially appraisal Logic Motivational, cognitive Labels N/A
MAMID Appraisal BDI Motivational Sharp Planning
FCM emotions Appraisal FCM Cognitive, motivational Continuous N/A
xEmotion Appraisal, somatic, evolutionary Environment, needs, mood Motivational, cognitive, physiological Fuzzy Changing set of actions
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org April 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 219
Kowalczuk and Czubenko Computational Approaches to Modeling Artificial Emotion
Overall, it is very difficult to definitively determine what are
the advantages and disadvantages of the applied systems of com-
putational emotions. In some applications, some of these schemes
work better or worse than others. Of course, certain concepts of
use are very simple. For example, it is typical to use such a system
to modify only an emotional reaction, such as facial expressions
or tone of voice (then a chosen emotion implements the system
reaction). Some basic criteria for the selection of a computational
system of emotions are given in Table 2.
When deciding to implement one of the presented systems, it
is important to clarify the expectations that we have in relation
to the intended computational system of emotions. In simple
mobile robotics, models using sharp emotions that directly induce
(implemented earlier) behavior, appear to bemost optimal. In this
case, you need to take into account the components that affect
the formation of emotions. Certainly, the appraisal analysis of
stimuli from the environment should be carried out in real time.
This means that Cathexis and xEmotion (both using simplifying
fuzzy emotions), or EMAmay be recommended for simplemobile
robots. On the other hand, robots with greater computing power
can be designed using systems based on fuzzy representation of
emotions and having the ability to indirectly shape the agent’s
behavior, such as xEmotion, FLAME, and EMA.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article, a variety of computational models of emotion
designed to reflect the principal aspects of psychological theory
have been described. Affective computation can lead to effective
control and decision-making mechanisms in various branches of
science and technology. The created emotional architecture can
be used to rationalize the quest for the role of emotion in human
cognition and behavior. From the control theory viewpoint, com-
putational models of emotion can play an important scheduling
control role in designing autonomous systems and agents. In this
way, adapting the emotional systems to robot applications may
lead to more flexible behavior and rapid response of this type of
artificial creatures and agents.
Since the creation and development of the various humanoid
robots, such as the ASIMO and Valkyrie (Kowalczuk and
Czubenko, 2015), robotics may also utilize the discussed com-
putational models of emotions that allow making human–system
interaction more user-friendly. Such an aspiration can be
noticed in several robotic programs, such as the FLASH robot
(Dziergwa et al., 2013), which is able to manifest different emo-
tion by changing the poses of its “face.” Due to the above,
one can easily anticipate a bright future ahead for emotional
robots.
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